Lee’s Lost Dispatch and Other Civil War Controversies
By Phillip Leigh
Illustrated, photos, maps, notes, bibliography, index, 224 pp. softcover $18.95
Westholme Publishing 2015
www.westholmepublishing.com
Phillip Leigh, whose last book, Trading With the Enemy, I reviewed a while back, has produced another volume for the Civil War reader. This one is a series of essays on various controversies, mysteries, and other aspects of the war. Briefly, they are:
• The Biggest Confederate Error. Leigh sees this as Jefferson Davis’ decision to hold Southern cotton off the market to put pressure on England and France to intervene. In retrospect, however, Davis missed a golden opportunity to supplement his meagre war chest while he still could. Had the cotton been sold and the money put into European banks, the Confederacy would have had more money than the United States to buy badly needed war materiel. Once the blockade became effective, it was too late.
• The Biggest Union Error. Should the Union have instituted a “Manhattan Project” to arm its armies with repeaters? Leigh argues that this would have been a war winner and would have shortened the war by at least a year. Instead, it was unconscionably delayed by a combination of military conservatism, civilian politics, and bureaucratic bungling. My reaction is “maybe” and think this the least convincing of his essays. The industrial revolution was just getting started and still in the process of making the transition from craft production to mass production. It was not what it was 50 years later during WWI, nor was the idea of state supervision of industry during wartime yet in force (although the North was still capable of some astounding feats of industrial production, as evidenced by the swift completion of the ironclad Monitor).
The Union did in fact recognize the need for a breech loader as early as 1863, but due to bureaucratic inertia the trials, which resulted in the Trapdoor breech-loading conversion for the Springfield rifle, were not finalized until near the end of the war. Still, as Joseph Bilby has documented, the Federals greatly increased the numbers of both repeaters and breech loaders as the war progressed. A large proportion of their cavalry were armed with them. In mid-1864 each infantry corps in Virginia was given enough Spencers to arm one regiment, as well as the sharpshooter companies of each division. Many of the line regiments had substantial numbers of Sharps breech loaders, which were usually given to the flank companies.
One must also consider the increased logistical burden that breech loaders and especially repeaters imposed. In an age when most ammunition had to be hauled around the battlefield in wagons or on muleback, this was a serious consideration. Military leaders also feared, not without reason, that soldiers given these weapons, especially green ones, would quickly fire off their ammunition.
• Preempting the Civil War. There were of course many opportunities in retrospect, but Leigh argues that if Lincoln had sent in a heavily-armed warship instead of the Star of the West to Charleston, South Carolina might have backed down, as they had for Andrew Jackson. If threats failed, the warship could simply have outgunned the insurgents and ended the rebellion then and there.
• Treasury Innovations and Mischiefs. As he showed in his last book, Leigh is especially strong when dealing with financial matters. In this essay he discusses Union financing of the war, and how it was necessary to radically expand credit and the money supply, and to adopt deficit financing. All in all a very thorough look at the problem and the rise of the greenback. Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase was the author of most of these creative innovations, although he, like many others, was not above benefiting from it personally.
• The Camelot Couple concerns the marriage of Chase’s daughter Kate and William Sprague, a wealthy lawyer and politician with high ambitions. While it’s not exactly a controversy, it is an interesting story full of political double dealing, infidelity, and much more. As Leigh details, both the marriage and their political ambitions ultimately came to nothing.
• The Burning of Atlanta. Here Leigh wades into a topic that has gotten more attention lately – the Union “harsh war” policy and the treatment of Southern civilians and their property. He convincingly argues that at best Sherman turned a blind eye to the depredations of his men, and at worst encouraged it as a way to bring the Confederacy to its knees. Although some others have argued that Atlanta was not really burned, he shows just how extensive the damage really was, and how it fit into a larger pattern of deliberate destruction by Sherman’s armies.
• Choosing Sherman or Thomas. The argument about whether William T. Sherman or George Thomas was the better general has been going on for some time, and Leigh comes down firmly on the side of Thomas. He goes even further in arguing that Thomas would have done a better job than Sherman as Union commander in the 1864 Atlanta campaign, and that Grant erred in selecting him.
• The Spring Hill Spies looks at the near-miraculous escape of a Union force under General John Schofield at Spring Hill, Tenn., which marched to safety literally within sight of Hood’s Army of Tennessee without a shot being fired on the night of November 28, 1864. Had Hood caught Schofield, the battle of Franklin, fought the next day, might have turned out very differently. Leigh considers several explanations, including the intriguing postwar account of one J. D. Remington, who claimed to have been a Union spy who planted false information about what was transpiring at Confederate headquarters.
• Ghosts of the Lost Dispatch. The loss of Lee’s Special Order 191during the Maryland campaign gives the book its title and gets a detailed look. Leigh, like most historians, concludes the order came from D. H. Hill’s headquarters and considers possible scenarios, but the possibilities remain many.
• Florida after Vicksburg. Florida had the smallest population of any of the Southern states yet was vitally important as “the storehouse of the Confederacy.” Its importance increased exponentially after the fall of Vickburg, when it became the Confederacy’s main source of beef and one of its main sources of salt. Leigh considers the economic and strategic value of Florida, as well as Lincoln’s attempt, dashed at Olustee, to set up a puppet pro-Union government for the purpose of having Florida secede back to the Union. He also looks at one of the war’s most colorful units, the “Cow Cavalry” – Florida cowmen (there were no cowboys in Florida) who guarded and drove the herds to railheads in Georgia and the Carolinas. This is one of my interests also and I found it very informative, although it too can’t really be called a controversy.
• Lincoln and McClellan. The relationship between the President and his General-in-Chief is well-trodden territory, but Leigh adds some fresh light on Little Mac’s accomplishments and failures, concentrating on the larger strategic picture.
Overall well written and argued, and though you may not agree with all his conclusions, it is well worth reading. The books itself is well edited and layed out, and there are a number of maps to supplement the text. At only $18.95, it has the additional virtue of being very reasonably priced in this day of expensive books. Recommended.
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