The Battle of Resaca: Atlanta Campaign 1864
by Philip L. Secrist
Chapter 1 – The Plan of Battle
1. Secrist briefly discusses Sherman’s plan of action prior to the Atlanta Campaign. Sherman was looking to win a decisive engagement somewhere south of Rome, Georgia. Johnston’s Army would then disintegrate, leaving the way open to Atlanta with little or no resistance. As Sherman confronted Johnston along Rocky Face Ridge near Dalton, Georgia, he knew he couldn’t attack this impregnable position directly. In a move soon to become very familiar to all involved, Sherman sent McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee on a flanking move towards Snake Creek Gap, while keeping Johnston’s attention with the larger Army of the Cumberland. Secrist states that transportation was key to the campaign. Without control of the Western & Atlantic Railroad, which ran south from Chattanooga to Atlanta, Sherman couldn’t feed his troops. In essence the, the campaign became a daily fight over the railroad, and Resaca was the “first important contest for that railroad”.
2. George Thomas actually proposed the flanking move to Sherman and offered to lead the Army of the Cumberland, but Sherman turned him down and chose McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee instead. Sherman distrusted the ability of Thomas and his men to move quickly, which would be a necessity in this type of flanking operation. Once through Snake Creek Gap, McPherson was to proceed east to cut the Western & Atlantic somewhere near Calhoun, Georgia (which was due south of Resaca). Sherman ordered McPherson to push ahead, because he feared a slow pursuit in which Johnston would gain strength while Sherman lost it in detachments to guard his supply line.
Chapter 2 – First Try for Resaca
1. Secrist describes the area around Resaca as “rough and hilly farmland…interspersed in 1864 with thick underbrush”. The town itself had been named after the Mexican War Battle of Resaca de la Palma by laborers working on its buildings. In 1864, only a few dozen structures and a freight building existed. The Oostanaula and Conasauga Rivers bordered the town on the south and east, respectively. On May 7, Johnston got word of Federals at Lafayette, just west of his picket line. On May 5, Loring’s Division had been ordered to Resaca, but had not reached that place by May 9 when 10,000 men of Dodge’s XVI Corps appeared. The only troops the Confederates had present were two regiments of Cantey’s Brigade and and the small cavalry brigade of Grigsby. Dodge thought he was a diversion while other troops pushed on north of town to cut the railroad, but in fact he was supposed to be the main effort. There had been a misunderstanding between McPherson and Sherman as well. Sherman wanted McPherson to cut the railroad and entrench across it. McPherson thought he was to cut the railroad, then retreat and hold Snake Creek Gap. In any event, Dodge’s troops drove Cantey and the Rebel cavalry into the main Resaca works with ease. At this point, Secrist asserts that McPherson merely needed to order his men forward and Resaca was theirs. Instead, McPherson sent all available cavalry to the railroad, where they destroyed a small section north of Resaca. Veatch’s Division of Dodge’s Corps was then ordered northeast to wreck the railroad, but was inexplicably ordered to halt and return to Bald Hill (west of Resaca). McPherson retreated that night to Snake Creek Gap.
2. McPherson’s failure to cut the railroad is one of the major controversies of the Atlanta Campaign (and in fact, the entire Civil War). I don’t know all that much about this controversy, having read Albert Castel’s Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 around 13 years ago. However, my ignorance doesn’t necessarily have to be yours. Mark Grimsley’s blog has an excellent set of entries on McPherson’s decisions at Snake Creek Gap.
Chapter 3 – The Battle at the Angle
1. On the evening of May 11, Sherman ordered all of his Corps to Resaca, with only Howard’s IV Corps of the Army of the Cumberland following Johnston directly south down the railroad. After some rapid marches, the Union Army set up on the hills west and northwest of Resaca on May 13. McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee set up on the right flank, with Thomas’ Cumberlanders in the center. Schofield’s Army of the Ohio arrived on the far left on the morning of May 14, and Howard’s IV Corps extended Schofield’s line farther left that afternoon. The Confederates formed a semicircle west and north of Resaca. Polk’s Corps faced McPherson while Hardee took on Thomas and Schofield. Hood’s Corps made up the far right. On May 14, Thomas and Schofield were ordered to make a large pivot to attack the Rebels.
2. Judah’s and Cox’s Divisions of the XXIII Corps ended up bearing the brunt of the attack at The Angle, a bend in Hardee’s works, but Carlin’s Brigade of Palmer’s XIV Corps made the first attacks at 9:00 A.M. This attack degenerated into desultory firing the rest of the day. Judah attacked soon afterward, but he clumsily handled his division and blundered into the left flank of the XIV Corps. His attack did not last long, and Judah was sacked several days later for his ineptness. Due to Judah’s quick repulse, Cox faced fire on his front and flank. He did manage to take some advanced Confederate works, but he soon was stopped. The attack had not been well coordinated. Secrist says, “all things considered, the limited success of Sherman’s brigadiers at the forks of the creek that day was not especially surprising”. Not long after this lull, Howard’s IV Corps arrived, but they were unable to stretch the left flank of the Union line to the Conasauga River. Hood showed up opposite Howard on Hardee’s right. After the XXIII Corps attack the Federals opened a 3-hour bombardment of the Rebel lines. Hotchkiss’ Confederate Battery was completely disabled by 11 A.M. of the 15th by counterbattery fire alone.
Chapter 4 – Stopped by the 5th Indiana Battery
By mid-afternoon of May 14 Sherman gave up his attacks on The Angle. Howard’s IV Corps had arrived by this time. Newton’s Division took the place of Cox’s XXIII Corps Division, allowing him to withdraw and replenish his ammunition. Wood extended the line farther left (east), and Stanley’s Division attempted to extend the flank to anchor on the Conasauga River. Unfortunately for the IV Corps, Stanley didn’t have enough men. The Confederates saw that Stanley’s flank was in the air, and two divisions of Hood’s Corps (Stewart and Stevenson) were sent to attack. Stewart’s Division got confused in the woods, and they moved due north, never finding the Union flank. Stevenson, however, moved off in a northwesterly direction and routed one of Newton’s brigades. They were moving forward against the 5th Indiana Battery when Robinson’s Brigade (3rd B/1st D/XX Corps) moved up in support. The guns and the infantry were enough to stop Stevenson cold. Secrist says the Confederate “effort was too feeble to pose a decisive threat”, and believes that nightfall, a poorly coordinated Confederate attack, and a generous measure of good luck saved the Union left.
Chapter 5 – Polk’s Battlefield
1. While Hood’s attack was going on, a fight was taking place on Polk’s far left on some hills along the Oostanaula River. Secrist believes that Sherman had an excellent opportunity here to trap and crush Johnston’s Army. Sherman’s “decision to capture these hills seems, in retrospect, to have been almost an afterthought”. McPherson decided to assault the low hills to prevent Polk from reinforcing Hood over on the Rebel right. With possession of the hills, the Union batteries could fire on the Railroad Bridge across the Oostanaula from only a quarter mile away!
2. Logan’s XV Corps attacked at 6 P.M., and Cantey’s Brigade, poor in body and spirit, fled before this attack. The main Rebel line 400 yards away fired artillery point-blank into the new Union position. Polk realized too late that he needed to get possession of those hills back immediately. The Union troops dug earthworks to consolidate their gains, and Polk attacked twice, but by 8 P.M. gave up trying to retake the hills. Fighting lasted until 10 P.M. Secrist says Sherman was preoccupied with defending against an attack or making sure he was ready to follow if Johnston retreated rather then with the idea of attacking himself. He says Johnston realized that he was in trouble should Sherman decide to attack his left at Resaca. Sherman’s right was less than 500 yards from the railroad bridge, and only a little farther from Johnston’s pontoon bridges. Secrist calls Polk’s Corps “newly-constituted and un-battle tested”, and says Sherman should have attacked on May 15. Instead, Sherman chose to simply entrench artillery on the hills.
3. Johnston had no reserves, while Sherman had Corps-size reserves. Secrist compares this situation to McClellan and Lee at Antietam, and says Sherman lost an opportunity at Resaca similar to McClellan’s at that battle. I find that to be a very interesting comparison, and one that I had not heard made prior to reading this book.
Chapter 6 – The Fight for the Four-Gun Battery
1. By May 15, Johnston was more worried about a Union force that had crossed south of the Oostanaula several miles west of Resaca. It turned out to be only a part of one Federal division, but Johnston sent Walker’s Division to deal with the threat.
2. Johnston proposed to attack Howard’s IV Corps on May 15. This attack actually started at 4 P.M., but the Federals had a larger assault in the works in the same area. Hood’s men didn’t get far before Geary’s and Butterfield’s XX corps divisions attacked Van Den Corput’s Cherokee Battery several hundred yards east of the Angle in a slightly advanced work. By this time, Johnston thought the Federals south of the Oostanaula were part of a larger effort there and tried to call of Hood’s attack, but it was too late. Stephenson and Stewart didn’t coordinate well, and Secrist says they never received orders countermanding their attack. “May 15 was a mix of confusion, frustration, and bloodshed” in Hood’s Corps, according to Secrist.
3. Hooker prepared in great detail for a limited gain, but even that wasn’t accomplished. Secrist says May 15 wasn’t one of Hooker’s better days. Howard was to support his left while the XXIII Corps took care of his right. The Union troops secured ground in a ravine fronting the works of the Cherokee Battery and stayed all afternoon. That night they drug the four guns of the Cherokee Battery away after digging a hole in the Confederate earthworks. Secrist concludes that “despite the rejoicing produced by the capture of the Confederate battery, it was quite clear to all that the Union gains that day had fallen far short of expectations”.
4. Johnston “quietly and skillfully abandoned Resaca” on the evening of May 15. Secrist points out that Sherman had neglected to close this route by attacking. He is very critical of Sherman, saying he was not good at tactics and that his reputation in that area is wholly undeserved. While I am a fan of “Cump” Sherman, I tend to agree to an extent with Secrist. Sherman’s performance at Shiloh and Missionary Ridge among others could leads one to a conclusion similar to Secrist’s. Secrist also claims that the Confederate Army would most certainly have been doomed if McPherson had attacked again on May 15 along the Oostanaula. I disagree because rarely were Civil War armies destroyed as a result of a battle, and I think Johnston would have fought off McPherson from behind his strong entrenchments and escaped anyway. I think it might have hastened Atlanta’s fall had McPherson successfully attacked, but I don’t believe that Johnston’s Army would have been destroyed outright.
Chapter 7 – The Battlefield Abandoned – Sherman Moves South
1. The dead were buried by the Federals on May 16 and the following days. Casualties exceeded those at First Bull Run, but were dwarfed by some larger battles. Secrist believes that “examined alone…Resaca should add no luster to Sherman’s reputation”. He says that Sherman had large numerical advantage (2:1), and that people have called him a tactical genius, but that McClellan was cashiered for a similar performance at Antietam. According to the author, Sherman’s reputation for tactical success was not warranted, and Sherman never claimed he was a master tactician. He goes on to say that in numerous battles, “Sherman consistently demonstrated mediocrity”. Secrist again goes back to talking about Sherman’s 2:1 strength advantage and that he should have “destroyed” his enemy. I say that this rarely if ever happened, and that Sherman is being held to an ahistorically high standard in this case. Secrist says that Resaca was a major strategic defeat for Sherman and that after this Sherman “reverted to his proven strength–that of master raider”. Secrist finishes off the chapter by saying that Sherman’s reputation is unwarranted, though he should get credit for waging a campaign based on his Army’s and his own limitations. I again disagree to an extent I don’t think he waged a campaign based on limitations so much as waging one based on his strengths. Sherman was an excellent strategist, and his campaign, aside from the ill-advised assault at Kennesaw Mountain, was a model of maneuver to avoid bloodshed. Sherman advanced many miles farther than Grant with far less total casualties during similar time frames, although Robert E. Lee might have had something to do with that.
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