The Army of the Potomac (Volume 2): McClellan Takes Command, September 1861-February 1862 by Russel H. Beatie

Comments:

New: 7/28/05

Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command, September 1861-February 1862. Russel H. Beatie. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press (October 20, 2004). 636 pp. 21 maps.

This is a review and summary of Russel H. Beatie’s book Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command, September 1861-February 1862. This is the second volume in Beatie’s potentially monumental multi-volume effort attempting to cover the command decisions in the higher levels of the Union’s most famous Army. Volume 2 picks up where Volume 1 left off. George B. McClellan had been appointed to command the Army of the Potomac after McDowell’s less than stellar showing at First Bull Run. Throughout this book, Beatie attempts to explain how McClellan, his subordinates, the politicians, and everyone else involved created an Army out of the ashes of the Manassas defeat. Beatie argues that there was an unfair prejudice against West Pointers and that political appointees many times were in over their heads at various levels of command. He also details the events that led to McClellan outmaneuvering the venerable Gen. Scott into a not-so-early retirement and the interference of politicians in the day-to-day workings of the Army of the Potomac, especially with regards to the notorious Committee on the Conduct of the War, led by Radical Republican Benjamin Wade, and late in the book when Edwin Stanton became the Secretary of War, and McClellan’s immediate enemy. But to me, the most important contribution Beatie makes is his painstaking recreation of the relationship between McClellan as General-in-Chief and Lincoln as Commander-In-Chief. Beatie seems to be more tolerant of McClellan’s peculiarities and less impressed with Lincoln’s understanding of military affairs than the average writer. I do not mind this at all because Beatie has done such an enormous amount of research and has dug into so many manuscripts that we may be seeing for the first time a fair and unbiased opinion on a very controversial time in the Army’s history.

The book starts out in September of 1861, and McClellan had been in command of the AotP for only about a month. But he had already begun to improve discipline, morale, and most importantly, the defenses of Washington. In late September he advanced to Munson’s Hill, several miles southwest of Alexandria, Virginia and the Capital. This allowed the Union Army to create an extended line of defense farther away from the Potomac River, and it finally freed the North of the embarrassment of having forward pickets of the Rebel Army within just a few miles of the District of Columbia. At the outset, McClellan had many friends within the government, but that soon changed for several reasons. First, Little Mac was pretty naïve when it came to high level politics, and he treated many potential future friends rudely, slowly but surely driving them into the opposing camp. Secondly, McClellan and many of his highest ranking subordinates and friends were anti-abolitionist, anti-hard war, and staunch Democrats. This did not sit well with the Radical Republicans and the Abolitionists, who soon suspected the General of Southern and slaveholding sympathies. Thirdly, McClellan (and through him Brig. General Charles P. Stone) suffered a humiliating defeat at Ball’s Bluff. This led to the creation of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. These Radical Senators led by Benjamin Wade wanted a scapegoat for the death of their compatriot Edward Baker, who in reality was the main person responsible for Ball’s Bluff. Lastly, as the months ticked on, McClellan refused to move forward, and the government, the newspapers, and the general public clamored for an advance. All of these things led to the slow fall of McClellan’s standing in many eyes.

In the middle section of the book, Beatie discusses the various “Pools” from which the General Officers of the Army of the Potomac came. He explains that many men came from more than one pool. The four pools he divides candidates into include the Bull Run Pool, the West Point & Regular Officer Pool, the Foreigner & Politician Pool, and the Gubernatorial Pool. The Bull Run Pool included such men as Erasmus Keyes, William T. Sherman, and Samuel Heintzelman. They had commanded large numbers of troops in combat at First Bull Run and had come out of the experience invariably wiser, if not always with enhanced reputations. The West Point & Regular Officer Pool was a large pool and consisted, naturally enough, of men who had graduated from the Military Academy at West Point and/or had served in the Regular pre-war Army as officers and enlisted men. This group included quite a few members of the Bull Run Pool, and contained generally Democrats with more liberal views on how to prosecute the war. Many politicians became suspicious of the West Point men and thought they harbored treasonous men in their midst (for no good reason, argues Beatie). The third pool consisted of foreigners and pre-war politicians. Men such as Franz Sigel were very useful to the Lincoln administration since they represented ethnic minorities (German immigrants in Sigel’s case) and could be counted on to raise the patriotic fervor amongst their own countrymen. This class also included men such as John “Black Jack” Logan, a politician from southern Illinois. The quality of the men from this pool was less than desirable in many cases, and would lead to disastrous results in places. One need look no farther than Baker and Ball’s Bluff for the perfect example. Lincoln decided that the benefits outweighed the risks at this early stage in the war, and many men received a spot due to political or ethnic considerations. The last group was the Gubernatorial Pool. Early in the war, the Governors of the individual states raised regiments for the Union cause and appointed Generals to lead them. This group was also of mixed quality, though some men such as Philip Kearney became or already were excellent soldiers.

The next part of the book deals mainly with McClellan’s struggles against real and perceived enemies. General Winfield Scott was General-In-Chief, and McClellan succeeded in getting the old soldier to finally step down and give him the title. Beatie details the events, and he doesn’t paint McClellan’s actions in an overly positive light. Still, Beatie seems to believe that this was a necessary step in order to further the development of the AotP. At this stage, McClellan had started to build up enemies, for the reasons listed in my introduction above. His seemingly overcautious nature, his Democratic leanings and the same leanings by many of his officers, and the disaster at Ball’s Bluff had caused the Radical Republicans to form the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Beatie pulls no punches in his scathing remarks on this group. As a lawyer, Beatie knows the judicial system in this country and is eminently qualified to remark on the proceedings of Wade’s Committee. He points out the obvious fact that the Radical Republicans used the Committee as a group of witch hunters, and they tried to get at McClellan through his subordinates. First to fall (and the only one in this particular volume, there will be others later, including Little Mac himself) was Charles P. Stone for his role in the affair at Ball’s Bluff. While Beatie asserts that McClellan could have handled the situation better, especially with regards to McCall’s Division on Stone’s left at Dranesville, he takes great pains to point out that Stone was essentially innocent of any charges against him and mentions that Stone was never really directly accused of anything, and that he was held as a prisoner illegally.

As 1861 ended, McClellan fell ill and Lincoln decided to try to “borrow” (his phrase) the AotP for awhile. Lincoln read up on strategy and tactics in the Library of Congress, and he conferred with his Cabinet and Generals McDowell and Franklin. McDowell, anxious to atone for his disaster at Bull Run, suggested a direct movement forward to attack the Rebels near Manassas a second time. Franklin, in whom McClellan had confided his plans, mentioned that the Young Napoleon wanted to try taking his Army by ship to a point on Virginia’s coast near Richmond, and thus force the Confederates to abandon their forward lines and come to the defense of their Capital. In this way, he could avoid unnecessary bloodshed. McClellan recovered and angrily took control again. Relations between Lincoln and McClellan were never the same after that point, says Beatie. He talked about the “new” Lincoln, more apt to interfere in military matters, and the “new” McClellan, who grew more and more suspicious of the politicians in his midst. This combination, along with the appointment of Edwin Stanton as the new Secretary of War, boded ill as McClellan finally decided on the amphibious attack plan as February drew to a close.

Beatie is writing an excellent history of the Army of the Potomac so far, IMHO. I enjoy his writing style, and while it admittedly does not always flow as smoothly as some of the better story tellers like Sears, Catton, and Foote, he keeps me interested and informed, the two key points I have come to demand in any book I read on the Civil War. I was VERY impressed with Beatie’s bibliography in his first volume, and this book brings more of the same. I would expect no less of a man who has literally spent decades compiling evidence and sources for his life’s culminating masterwork. His knowledge and use of the many manuscripts and diaries of the principal players involved continues to amaze me. There are 21 maps in the book. They are more than adequate for the topic of the book. Beatie is not rehashing the battles of this Army. Rather, he is discussing the development and the decisions of the upper level commanders (Brigade level and above) of the Army of the Potomac. As such, the maps are more than sufficient to give the reader a good idea of why certain decisions were made and where important geographic features are in relation to one another. I know of no better book on this subject, and from the looks of things, I believe that this series will become the standard by which all others are judged.

In conclusion, I believe Beatie accomplishes quite well what he set out to do in this volume. Namely, he wants to detail the rise of McClellan, his important role in the shaping of the Union’s most important Army and guardian of the Capital, and the relationships among McClellan, his subordinates, and the politicians sustaining them. He writes in what some might consider a sometimes awkward style, changing indirect discourse to direct discourse, but these slight shortcomings are more than made up for throughout the course of the book by the author’s vast knowledge of his subject. Anyone remotely interested in the strategic aspects of the Civil War, of the workings of Civil War Armies, and especially of the Army of the Potomac in particular should own this book. I am eagerly looking forward to volume 3.

Russel H. Beatie	The Army of the Potomac (Volume 2): McClellan Takes Command, September 1861-February 1862
Comments: New: 7/28/05 Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command, September 1861-February 1862. Russel H. Beatie. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press (October 20, 2004). 636 pp. 21 maps. This is a review and summary of Russel H. Beatie’s book Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command, September 1861-February 1862. This is the second volume in Beatie’s potentially monumental multi-volume effort attempting to cover the command decisions in the higher levels of the Union’s most famous Army. Volume 2 picks up where Volume 1 left off. George B. McClellan had been appointed to command the Army of the Potomac after McDowell’s less than stellar showing at First Bull Run. Throughout this book, Beatie attempts to explain how McClellan, his subordinates, the politicians, and everyone else involved created an Army out of the ashes of the Manassas defeat. Beatie argues that there was an unfair prejudice against West Pointers and that political appointees many times were in over their heads at various levels of command. He also details the events that led to McClellan outmaneuvering the venerable Gen. Scott into a not-so-early retirement and the interference of politicians in the day-to-day workings of the Army of the Potomac, especially with regards to the notorious Committee on the Conduct of the War, led by Radical Republican Benjamin Wade, and late in the book when Edwin Stanton became the Secretary of War, and McClellan’s immediate enemy. But to me, the most important contribution Beatie makes is his painstaking recreation of the relationship between McClellan as General-in-Chief and Lincoln as Commander-In-Chief. Beatie seems to be more tolerant of McClellan’s peculiarities and less impressed with Lincoln’s understanding of military affairs than the average writer. I do not mind this at all because Beatie has done such an enormous amount of research and has dug into so many manuscripts that we may be seeing for the first time a fair and unbiased opinion on a very controversial time in the Army’s history. The book starts out in September of 1861, and McClellan had been in command of the AotP for only about a month. But he had already begun to improve discipline, morale, and most importantly, the defenses of Washington. In late September he advanced to Munson’s Hill, several miles southwest of Alexandria, Virginia and the Capital. This allowed the Union Army to create an extended line of defense farther away from the Potomac River, and it finally freed the North of the embarrassment of having forward pickets of the Rebel Army within just a few miles of the District of Columbia. At the outset, McClellan had many friends within the government, but that soon changed for several reasons. First, Little Mac was pretty naïve when it came to high level politics, and he treated many potential future friends rudely, slowly but surely driving them into the opposing camp. Secondly, McClellan and many of his highest ranking subordinates and friends were anti-abolitionist, anti-hard war, and staunch Democrats. This did not sit well with the Radical Republicans and the Abolitionists, who soon suspected the General of Southern and slaveholding sympathies. Thirdly, McClellan (and through him Brig. General Charles P. Stone) suffered a humiliating defeat at Ball’s Bluff. This led to the creation of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. These Radical Senators led by Benjamin Wade wanted a scapegoat for the death of their compatriot Edward Baker, who in reality was the main person responsible for Ball’s Bluff. Lastly, as the months ticked on, McClellan refused to move forward, and the government, the newspapers, and the general public clamored for an advance. All of these things led to the slow fall of McClellan’s standing in many eyes. In the middle section of the book, Beatie discusses the various “Pools” from which the General Officers of the Army of the Potomac came. He explains that many men came from more than one pool. The four pools he divides candidates into include the Bull Run Pool, the West Point & Regular Officer Pool, the Foreigner & Politician Pool, and the Gubernatorial Pool. The Bull Run Pool included such men as Erasmus Keyes, William T. Sherman, and Samuel Heintzelman. They had commanded large numbers of troops in combat at First Bull Run and had come out of the experience invariably wiser, if not always with enhanced reputations. The West Point & Regular Officer Pool was a large pool and consisted, naturally enough, of men who had graduated from the Military Academy at West Point and/or had served in the Regular pre-war Army as officers and enlisted men. This group included quite a few members of the Bull Run Pool, and contained generally Democrats with more liberal views on how to prosecute the war. Many politicians became suspicious of the West Point men and thought they harbored treasonous men in their midst (for no good reason, argues Beatie). The third pool consisted of foreigners and pre-war politicians. Men such as Franz Sigel were very useful to the Lincoln administration since they represented ethnic minorities (German immigrants in Sigel’s case) and could be counted on to raise the patriotic fervor amongst their own countrymen. This class also included men such as John “Black Jack” Logan, a politician from southern Illinois. The quality of the men from this pool was less than desirable in many cases, and would lead to disastrous results in places. One need look no farther than Baker and Ball’s Bluff for the perfect example. Lincoln decided that the benefits outweighed the risks at this early stage in the war, and many men received a spot due to political or ethnic considerations. The last group was the Gubernatorial Pool. Early in the war, the Governors of the individual states raised regiments for the Union cause and appointed Generals to lead them. This group was also of mixed quality, though some men such as Philip Kearney became or already were excellent soldiers. The next part of the book deals mainly with McClellan’s struggles against real and perceived enemies. General Winfield Scott was General-In-Chief, and McClellan succeeded in getting the old soldier to finally step down and give him the title. Beatie details the events, and he doesn’t paint McClellan’s actions in an overly positive light. Still, Beatie seems to believe that this was a necessary step in order to further the development of the AotP. At this stage, McClellan had started to build up enemies, for the reasons listed in my introduction above. His seemingly overcautious nature, his Democratic leanings and the same leanings by many of his officers, and the disaster at Ball’s Bluff had caused the Radical Republicans to form the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Beatie pulls no punches in his scathing remarks on this group. As a lawyer, Beatie knows the judicial system in this country and is eminently qualified to remark on the proceedings of Wade’s Committee. He points out the obvious fact that the Radical Republicans used the Committee as a group of witch hunters, and they tried to get at McClellan through his subordinates. First to fall (and the only one in this particular volume, there will be others later, including Little Mac himself) was Charles P. Stone for his role in the affair at Ball’s Bluff. While Beatie asserts that McClellan could have handled the situation better, especially with regards to McCall’s Division on Stone’s left at Dranesville, he takes great pains to point out that Stone was essentially innocent of any charges against him and mentions that Stone was never really directly accused of anything, and that he was held as a prisoner illegally. As 1861 ended, McClellan fell ill and Lincoln decided to try to “borrow” (his phrase) the AotP for awhile. Lincoln read up on strategy and tactics in the Library of Congress, and he conferred with his Cabinet and Generals McDowell and Franklin. McDowell, anxious to atone for his disaster at Bull Run, suggested a direct movement forward to attack the Rebels near Manassas a second time. Franklin, in whom McClellan had confided his plans, mentioned that the Young Napoleon wanted to try taking his Army by ship to a point on Virginia’s coast near Richmond, and thus force the Confederates to abandon their forward lines and come to the defense of their Capital. In this way, he could avoid unnecessary bloodshed. McClellan recovered and angrily took control again. Relations between Lincoln and McClellan were never the same after that point, says Beatie. He talked about the “new” Lincoln, more apt to interfere in military matters, and the “new” McClellan, who grew more and more suspicious of the politicians in his midst. This combination, along with the appointment of Edwin Stanton as the new Secretary of War, boded ill as McClellan finally decided on the amphibious attack plan as February drew to a close. Beatie is writing an excellent history of the Army of the Potomac so far, IMHO. I enjoy his writing style, and while it admittedly does not always flow as smoothly as some of the better story tellers like Sears, Catton, and Foote, he keeps me interested and informed, the two key points I have come to demand in any book I read on the Civil War. I was VERY impressed with Beatie’s bibliography in his first volume, and this book brings more of the same. I would expect no less of a man who has literally spent decades compiling evidence and sources for his life’s culminating masterwork. His knowledge and use of the many manuscripts and diaries of the principal players involved continues to amaze me. There are 21 maps in the book. They are more than adequate for the topic of the book. Beatie is not rehashing the battles of this Army. Rather, he is discussing the development and the decisions of the upper level commanders (Brigade level and above) of the Army of the Potomac. As such, the maps are more than sufficient to give the reader a good idea of why certain decisions were made and where important geographic features are in relation to one another. I know of no better book on this subject, and from the looks of things, I believe that this series will become the standard by which all others are judged. In conclusion, I believe Beatie accomplishes quite well what he set out to do in this volume. Namely, he wants to detail the rise of McClellan, his important role in the shaping of the Union’s most important Army and guardian of the Capital, and the relationships among McClellan, his subordinates, and the politicians sustaining them. He writes in what some might consider a sometimes awkward style, changing indirect discourse to direct discourse, but these slight shortcomings are more than made up for throughout the course of the book by the author’s vast knowledge of his subject. Anyone remotely interested in the strategic aspects of the Civil War, of the workings of Civil War Armies, and especially of the Army of the Potomac in particular should own this book. I am eagerly looking forward to volume 3. © Copyright Brett Schulte 2005. All rights reserved.